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Judgment Proofmg: A Rejoinder 
Steven L. Schwarcz* 
Professors LoPucki and Mooney have responded to my article, The In-
herent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing,l and I have been granted the op-
portunity to write a short rejoinder. Given page limitations and the fact that 
Professor Mooney and I are in agreement on the fundamentals, I discuss only 
Professor LoPucki's response.2 Both that response and my rejoinder follow 
my analytical approach of dividing judgment proof structures into two cate-
gories: arm's length and non-arm's length. 
My central points are straightforward. I don't claim that judgment 
proofing never will occur, merely that it is unlikely to cause, in LoPucki's 
words, the "death ofliability." Ann's length judgment proofing transactions 
are unlikely because they necessarily require the assistance of an independ-
ent company. However, the costs to the independent company are apt to ex-
ceed any benefits to the judgment proofed company. As a matter of social 
psychology, the independent company also will be risk averse in assessing 
those costs) NonMarm's length judgment proofing transactions, on the other 
hand, are not always subject to the same real or perceived costs, and there-
fore are more likely to occur. But non-arm's length judgment proofing is not 
new~the legal system historically has imposed a range of restrictions that 
tend to discourage it. Empirical data suggest that these restrictions are suffi-
cient; to the extent they become insufficient, the law is likely to evolve addi-
tional restrictions as necessary. 
The remainder of this rejoinder responds to LoPucki's more detailed 
comments. 
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1. 52 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Inherent Irrationality]. The responses are Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Irrefotable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. 
REv. 55 (1999) [hereinafter Irrefotable Logic] and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing, 
Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1999). 
2. LoPucki, by his own admission, responds to only some of my arguments. See Irrefotable 
Logic, supra note 1, at 55 (stating that "[t]he sheer number of [Schwarcz's] arguments makes it 
impossible for me to respond to all of them"). My rejoinder follows that limited response. 
3. Even though the independent company's costs cannot be precisely quantified, that very un-
certainty increases its perception of the risk. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
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I. ARM's LENGTH JUDGMENT PROOFING 
Professor LoPucki argues that asset securitization is a "dangerous" new 
judgment proofing technique,4 comparing it to "the invention of a new tool 
that makes burglary easier."5 That argument fails for three reasons. As I 
pointed out6 and LoPucki himself admits,7 securitization itself does not cause 
judgment proofing. Rather, judgment proofing would require an independent 
and unrelated disposition of assets to shareholders,s which could occur with-
out securitization.9 Secondly, even if one were to argue that securitization 
generates cash proceeds which could be paid to shareholders more easily, I 
have shown that no one will invest in a securitization where the company 
obligated for repayment makes itself judgment proof by disposing of the in-
vested proceeds.lO Indeed, the more nefarious that company is, the less 
likely that investors will trust it to perform its repayment obligation. Finally, 
LoPucki's comparison fails ab initio because a tool that makes burglary more 
efficient may have no legitimate uses, whereas securitization has a wide 
range of beneficial uses. The possible misuse of a beneficial tool should not 
undermine its legitimacy. Even a computer, for example, might be used as a 
burglary to 01. 11 It makes burglary easier by enabling the burglar to track his 
successful break-ins and sales to third-party fences. Indeed, LoPucki himself 
argues that computers are the ultimate engines behind much judgment 
proofing. Computers, however, have other uses than burglary (or judgment 
proofing), and burglaries (and judgment proofing) can occur without com-
puters. The possibility that a good tool can be used to make it easier to per-
form a bad action does not prove that the tool is bad. The key question is 
whether the dangers of misuse of the tool-whether computers or securitiza-
tion-outweigh the beneficial uses. 
LoPucki also claims, without citing any authority, that the "common 
consequence" of securitization is "reduction in the operating entity's (Fl's) 
ratio of assets to liability risk."12 That claim, however, is not only wrong but 
may be irrelevant. It is wrong because that ratio could not decrease without 
4. See id. at 56. 
5.Id. 
6. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 12-15. 
7. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 56. 
8. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 16 & n.73. 
9. See id. at 18. 
10. See id. at 14 & n.6I, wherein I conclude that "the likelihood that F2 would be able to ob-
tain securitization or other financing on the strength of a lease to FI is extremely remote. Few 
investors or bank lenders would be willing to take the risk that future rentals of a judgment proof 
lessee [FI] would be paid." For this very reason, LoPucki's use of an assetless F2 to argue that 
judgment proofing will not expose F2's assets to claims of FI's creditors or that F2 will not subject 
to reputational costs appears to be umealistic. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 64-66. 
11. I thank Stewart Schwab for this analogy. 
12. Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 56. 
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the disposition of assets to shareholders, a disposition that, if it occurs, would 
be independent of the securitization transaction.I3 In fact, the common con-
sequence of a securitization is to leave that ratio unchanged.I4 LoPucki's 
claim also would be irrelevant if, notwithstanding a reduced ratio of assets to 
liabilities, sufficient assets remain to enable Fl to pay its liabilities.Is 
LoPucki then focuses away from securitization onto more fundamental 
issues, questioning first my observation that the company wishing to judg-
ment-proof itself (FI) receives equivalent value in return.I6 In that context, 
he disagrees that a transfer of assets to pay creditors would be the antithesis 
of judgment proofing. His rationale is that payment of voluntary creditors, 
such as bank lenders, could prejudice involuntary creditors, such as tort 
creditors, if the debtor is ultimately insolvent)7 That may be so, but it is ir-
relevant. Preferential payment by an insolvent company always could preju-
dice remaining creditors, which is precisely why bankruptcy law avoids such 
preferential payments.I8 Finally, he alleges that my core statement-that a 
13. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. 
14. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCfURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION 2 (2d ed. 1993) (illustrating balance sheet impact of securitization); if a 
company sells its receivables, the ratio of assets to liabilities remains unchanged, and if the com-
pany also uses the sale proceeds to pay down debt, the ratio would actually improve). 
15. In another context, LoPucki has referred to a reduction of a company's ratio of assets to 
potential liabilities as "a kind of soft judgment proofing." Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment 
Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1430 (1998) (emphasis added). By his definition and 
mine, however, such a reduction would not be actual judgment proofing-even "soft" judgment 
proofing-unless the reduction is sufficient to deny a creditor recovery of a portion of its claim. 
See id. at 1421; Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 2 n.2. LoPucki also attempts to find signifi-
cance in my "dropping the word 'asset' from the phrase 'asset securitization.'" Irrefotable Logic, 
supra note 1, at 56-57. I intended nothing-the phrases are interchangeable. See, e.g., HAL S. 
SCOTT & PmLIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGU-
LATION 751 (5th ed. 1998) (using those phrases interchangeably). Professor LoPucki sums up his 
argument that securitization is a judgment proofing technique with strong rhetoric: "Even if cor-
rect, Schwarcz's argument for the 'legitimacy' of asset securitization in no way refutes my thesis. 
Liability will be just as dead whether it dies from 'asset securitization' or asset securitization fol-
lowed by a typical disposition of proceeds." Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 57 (footnotes omit-
ted). However, the first conclusion doesn't follow because I have shown, and LoPucki indeed has 
conceded, that asset securitization itself cannot cause judgment proofing. See id. at 56. The second 
conclusion doesn't follow because it incorrectly assumes that asset securitization is typically fol-
lowed by a disposition of proceeds. LoPucki attempts to justify that assumption by referring to 
examples of possible proceeds dispositions. See id. at 58 n.17. However, but the fact that a dispo-
sition is possible says nothing about whether it is typical. 
16. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 57-59. 
17. See id. at58. 
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1999) (avoiding such transfers, and providing that avoided payments 
be retumed to the debtor's estate for equal and ratable distribution to all creditors). A company's 
payments to voluntary creditors sometimes might tum out, in retrospect, to precede the pre-
bankruptcy preference period. Those payments then would not be avoidable as preferential under 
existing law. To the extent this becomes problematic, preference law could be amended to extend 
the preference period. Where there is actual intent to make those payments for the pwpose of 
judgment proofing, the payments also may be able to be avoided as fraudulent transfers under fed-
eral and state laws, which have longer statutes oflimitation. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l) (1993 
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transfer of assets to unrelated third parties should not cause judgment proof-
ing because no rational company will give away its assets without demand-
ing equivalent value in return-is "true on its face, but misleading in con-
text."19 His rationale appears unresponsive to my statement, however, since 
he refers only to third party creditors and shareholders whereas I refer to 
third parties "other than creditors and owners [shareholders]."2o 
Next, LoPucki claims that I don't quantitatively prove that the costs of 
judgment proofing necessarily outweigh its benefits.21 All observers, how-
ever, know that the costs and benefits of judgment proofing cannot be pre-
cisely quantified, at least with our current data and understanding.22 Indeed, 
the uncertainty that results from the inability to quantify these amounts 
makes it inherently risky for F2 to assist in Fl's judgment proofing. Moreo-
ver, in an arm's length context, F2 will be risk averse and therefore prone to 
exaggerate these risks.23 F2 is therefore unlikely to expose itself to liability 
by assisting in Fl's judgment proofmg. 
The inability to quantify these amounts also raises the issue of burden of 
proof. If it seems (based on LoPucki's arguments, intuition, and modeling) 
that the new financial tools he complains of lead to a major danger of judg-
ment proofing, then the burden is on those promoting those tools to demon-
strate that danger is clearly outweighed by benefits. On the other hand, if it 
seems (based on arguments, modeling, and intuition that I have tried to ar-
ticulate) that the dangers of those tools are exaggerated and their benefits are 
large, then the burden should be on those proposing regulation. 
Professor LoPucki also suggests that I fail to take into account that dif-
ferent companies have different potential amounts ofliability.24 To the con-
trary, however, I show that even the possibility of large mass tort claim li-
ability would not necessarily increase the amount of value that judgment 
& Supp. 1999) (authorizing avoidance of payments made, within one year prior to ban1<ruptcy, with 
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" any creditor); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr §§ 
4(a)(I), 9(a) (1984) (authorizing avoidance of payments made within past four years or, if later, 
within one year after the payment was or could reasonably have been discovered by the complain-
ing creditor, with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor"). If these longer statutes 
of limitation are still insufficient, they likewise could be extended, as has occurred in the past when 
"experience has demonstrated" that an extension is needed to avoid fraudulent activities. 4 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 548.02[2], at 548-26 (15th ed. 1996). 
19. Irrefutable Logic, supra note 2, at 59. 
20. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note I, at 16 (emphasis added). 
21. See Irrefutable Logic, supra note 1, at 59-67. 
22. LoPucki himself is aware that these costs and benefits cannot be precisely quantified. 
Letter from Lynn M. LoPucki to Steven L. Schwarcz 5 (Oct. 19, 1998) (on file with the Stanford 
Law Review). 
23. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note I, at 26-27 (discussing prospect theory and the so-
cial psychology of voluntary risk-taking). 
24. See Irrefutable Logic, supra note I, at 60 (stating that Schwarcz's argument fails to ac-
count for the variation among companies "in their liability risks and judgment proofing costs"). 
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proofing is expected to take from creditors.2s That amount is inherently lim-
ited by the amount of the company's assets.26 Thus, an increase in a com-
pany's tort liability actually may deter judgment proofing because the liabil-
ity of companies assisting in the judgment proofing is not so limited.27 Ad-
ditionally, he argues that I omit from my calculation three possible benefits 
to Fl, the judgment proofing entity: That the devices used for judgment 
proofing provide economic benefit even when they are not used for judgment 
proofing, so judgment proofing is purely a bonus; that judgment proof com-
panies can engage in high tort risk activity with impunity; and that judgment 
proofing eliminates the cost of risk management.28 However, his focus on 
Fl's benefits obscures the fact that F2 will be unlikely to engage in the 
judgment proofing transaction in the first place. 
Moreover, those benefits appear marginal at best. For example, his ar-
gument that judgment proofing is purely a bonus suggests that many of the 
costs referred to in my analysis would be incurred anyway by engaging in an 
economically beneficial securitization transaction. But that suggestion is 
misleading because my analysis does not purport to include securitization 
transaction costs. Also, his argument that judgment proof companies can 
engage in high tort risk activity ,vith impunity appears unrealistic. He hy-
pothesizes a company that considers a series of business opportunities se-
quentially, each opportunity having a "a 50% chance of a net gain of 100 
and ... a 50% chance of a net loss of 200."29 A non-judgment proof com-
pany '\vill decline to pursue the opportunities because [its] expected return 
from each opportunity [is] a loss of 50."30 In contrast, he argues, "[i]f the 
same firm could become judgment proof by shedding its assets and remain 
judgment proof by distributing any gains to shareholders before undertaking 
the next opportunity, the firm would pursue all the opportunities" because it 
then benefits from the chance of gain but, being judgment proof, avoids the 
risk ofloss.31 Thus, he concludes, the "gains from judgment proofing are not 
... merely the gains from protecting the debtor's finite assets [but] are gains 
from the extemalization of liability."32 That seems unlikely, however. As 
soon as the judgment proof company faces a loss, which is the immediately 
25. See Inherent Irrationality. supra note 1, at 49. 
26. See id. 
27. Seeid. at 50. 
28. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 62. 
29.Id. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (responding to my argument that the gain from judgment proofing a company is lim-
ited to the value of the company's assets absent judgment proofing). At another point in his analy-
sis, after admitting in a footnote that my argument would be correct, he conjectures, without basis, 
that I "apparently contemplate[ ]" an assumption that makes my argument wrong. Irrefotable 
Logic, supra note 1, at 61 n.36. In North Carolina, we would call his conjecture "chutzpah"! 
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likely scenario in LoPucki's hypothetical, it will be insolvent and unable to 
pay its debts as they come due, virtually leading to bankruptcy)3 Bank-
ruptcy judges are unlikely to condone further tortious undertakings, and thus 
the judgment proof company will not have more than one bite at the exter-
nalizing-torts revenue apple. Moreover, parties will not blindly enter into 
negative present value transactions with judgment proof companies. Survi-
vors in the rough and tumble of business transactions are far too savvy to 
become the willing victims of externalized liability. To the extent externali-
zation occurs, it therefore will be limited to involuntary parties (such as tort 
creditors), who are most likely to be protected by the bankruptcy judge. 
Finally, LoPucki claims that I overstate the costs of arm's length judg-
ment proofing by assuming that when an otherwise viable company owes 
debt in excess of its ability to pay, liquidation is likely to result.34 For "large 
public company bankruptcies," he counters, the ordinary outcome is for the 
fIrm to discharge its tort debt in bankruptcy while continuing its operations.35 
True, but large public companies are least likely to attempt to judgment-
proof themselves,36 whereas small companies ordinarily liquidate in bank-
ruptcy.37 Indeed, "[t]he most common type ofbanlauptcy case [for all com-
panies] is a liquidation bankruptcy case."38 LoPucki responds by arguing 
that "[ d]eliberately judgment-proofed fIrms are the type least likely to liqui-
date in bankruptcy" because "[t]ypically their distress will be the result of 
tort debt that exceeds their assets, that is, financial distress [as opposed to an 
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (pennitting creditors to force a company into involuntary bankruptcy 
under these conditions). This assumes the judgment proof company engages in the transaction, 
which itself is questionable because "corporate law should, and indeed under existing law already 
may, impose on directors of a corporation a fiduciary duty to creditors as well as shareholders when 
a risky venture is reasonably expected to prejUdice creditors." Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinlang 
Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEx. L. REv. 515, 589-90 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
34. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 63. 
35. Seeid. 
36. Large public companies, for example, would have the highest reputational costs. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,39-40 (1996) (explaining why large 
companies are much less likely to be judgment proof than small and medium size companies); id. at 
89 (concluding that "[f]or most large firms, the costs of judgment proofing still exceed the bene-
fits"). 
37. See DAVID G. EpSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 10-2, at 
734-35 (1993) (observing that although the Chapter 11 cases of most small businesses are converted 
to Chapter 7 liquidations, "[o]n the contrary, the Chapter 11 of a big business [to which a State is 
closer in analogy] usually leads to some form of reorganization"; and specUlating that the distinc-
tion might arise from the fact that "[m]any of the small Chapter 11 's [sic] belonged in Chapter 7 
from the beginning and never had any hope of a successful reorganization," and because of 
"economies of scale, a large business can bear [the cost ofa Chapter 11 case] more readily than a 
small one"). See also Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11,102 YALE 
L.J. 437, 443 (1992) (observing that "[o]nIy about 17% of all Chapter 11 cases manage to confirm a 
plan of reorganization"). 
38. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1997). Discharge is not available 
to a liquidating company. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(I), (a)(2) (1999). 
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inherently bad business]."39 Other things being equal, a company with an 
inherently good business would indeed be a good candidate for reorganiza-
tion, even though it may have financial distress. But other things are not 
equal if the company has deliberately judgment-proofed itself. A bankruptcy 
judge then is unlikely to allow the company to reorganize,40 much less to 
discharge its tort debt,41 in bankruptcy. 
I do not assert, however, that there never will be industries where liabil-
ity is so unpredictable and potentially so large and reputation costs so small 
that one might expect to see judgment proofing efforts. LoPucki himself 
refers to judgment proofing in the New York City taxicab industry, of which 
I am aware.42 Yet the law's evolution recently has limited judgment proof-
ing even in that context, such as by greatly increasing the amount of liability 
insurance coverage that taxicab owners must maintain43 and by making taxi-
cab medallion owners responsible for the leased operation of their cabs.44 
39. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 64. 
40. The Code specifically prohibits confirmation of a reorganization plan that has not been 
proposed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1993). Furthermore, where a Chapter 11 case has 
not been filed in good faith, the bankruptcy judge has discretion to convert it to Chapter 7 liquida-
tion. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1993 & Supp. 1999) (for cause, permitting conversion to Chapter 7 or 
dismissal of the case, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and of the estate). See also 
MARK S. SCARBERRY, KENNETH N. KLEE, GRANT W. NEWTON & STEVE H. NICKLES, BUSiNESS 
REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 944 (1996) (referring to lack of good faith as an "unstated 
'cause' for purposes of[§ 1112(b)]"). 
41. II U.S.C. § 1141(d) provides, in relevant part, that confirmation of a plan discharges the 
debts of a debtor reorganizing under a Chapter 11 plan, except as otherwise provided in the order 
confirming the plan. The rationale for permitting a discharge, nonvithstanding fraudulent acts on 
the debtor's part, is that "[w]hatever wrongful acts may have been committed by those in charge of 
the business in the past, it will do the creditors no good to deny the debtor a discharge-after the 
reorganization they likely will own all or a substantial part of the debtor's business, and a denial of 
discharge would harm their interests." SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 40, at 957. But if the reor-
ganizing debtor remains, for whatever reason, under the control of the defrauding person(s), a court 
could decide to disallow discharge. The situation then would be analogous to that of a fraudulent 
individual debtor who uses Chapter 11 to reorganize. Even though such a debtor, technically under 
§ 1141(d), could receive a discharge, "that is not likely to happen." Id. at 958. The judge, instead, 
is "likely to dismiss the case, to convert it to chapter 7 [liquidation], or to deny confirmation of the 
debtor's plan." Id. 
42. See Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 61 n.33. 
43. NEW YORK, N.Y., Tit 35, ch. 1, § 1-40 (1998) (stating that taxi owners must maintain 
coverage in an amount "not less than $200,000 per person"). 
44. See Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, No. 97 CV. 2551, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. Oct 1, 
1997) (holding a medallion owner liable for damages to a passenger caused by a lessee operating 
the cab). LoPucki also suggests that "[c]urrent events in the tobacco industry," such as spinoffs of 
subsidiaries and divisions, illustrate judgment proofing in that industry. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment 
Proofing: A Rejoinder. supra note 15, at 1430-31. However, spinoffs intended for judgment 
proofing or that would have the effect of denying creditors recovery of their claims (or a portion 
thereof) could be voidable under fraudulent conveyance law and might expose directors to liability. 
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking A Corporation's Obligation to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 
647, 678 & 679 n.133 (1996). Thus, RJR Nabisco's board of directors recently refused to spin off 
its non-tobacco business-a result demanded by shareholder Carl Icahn in order to eliminate the 
legal taint of tobacco on the conglomerate's food assets. Suein L. Hwang & Paul M. Sherer, RJR 
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ll. NON-ARM's LENGTH JUDGMENT PROOFING 
Professor LoPucki and I agree that, at least theoretically, this type of 
judgment proofing is more likely to occur than ann's length judgment 
proofing. We disagree, however, on whether it is in fact likely to occur. 
LoPucki claims that computerization will make the logistics of judgment 
proofing easier and cheaper by helping to keep track of assets transferred 
among members of a corporate group and lowering the transaction costs of 
maintaining elaborate corporate structures.4S But that claim is irrelevant to 
my argument. I have shown that non-ann's length strategies are merely ex-
amples of the ancient strategy of distributing one's assets to shareholders in 
preference to creditors.46 Computerization will not change that strategy. 
Furthermore, because I assign no costs to the types of logistical factors that 
computerization can facilitate, my analysis already implicitly assumes com-
puterization. Computerization, on the other hand, cannot reduce the legal 
liabilities47 which I argue provide the real deterrent to judgment proofing. 
LoPucki also argues that one can conceive of judgment proofing trans-
actions that might not be precisely restricted under existing law. I never 
claimed otherwise, however.48 Rather, I have shown that "where existing 
legal doctrines do not clearly cover judgment proofing, it is but a short step 
conceptually to apply those doctrines to it."49 For example, there is a '''lib-
Nabisco to Shed Tobacco Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1999, at A3. The directors apparently 
were concerned that the spinoff might subject them to personal liability, notwithstanding Icahn's 
presentation of a legal opinion from the law firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan that the proposed 
spinoff would not constitute a fraudulent conveyance under existing law. See Proxy Statement of 
RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp. 3 (Mar. 25, 1999); Proxy Statement of High River Limited Partner-
ship 4 (Apr. 8, 1999). Instead, the board decided to spin off the domestic tobacco business, a strat-
egy that does not purport to separate potential tobacco liabilities from the non-tobacco business. 
See Nabisco Holdings Corp., Form 8-K Current Report 3 (June 14, 1999). 
45. See I"efotable Logic, supra note 1, at 68. 
46. See Inherent I"ationality, supra note 1, at 50 n.264. 
47. Including tax consequences. 
48. I do show, however, that the more typical forms of non-arm's length judgment proofing 
are restricted under current law. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 31 & n.157 (discussing 
the application of the Eastgroup Properties case to "a judgment proofing structure that resembles 
this article's generic FI-F2-F3 structure"). 
49. Id. at 47. LoPucki himself acknowledges that "[t]hinking hypothetically and in the ab-
stract, probably most courts would gladly extend Schwarcz's eight theories to strike down" judg-
ment proofing. I"efotable Logic, supra note 1, at 69. But he then asserts that courts ultimately 
would refuse to extend those theories to sophisticated judgment proofing transactions because to do 
so would undermine "the very engines of the American economy." Id. He does not, however, 
expand on this rhetoric. In my experience, courts are not at all reluctant to apply their sense of 
justice to undermine sophisticated business transactions. See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 
214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to dismiss the collusive filing of involuntary bank-
ruptcy petitions intended to stop mortgage foreclosure, in order to preserve value of bankruptcy-
remote special purpose entities for limited partners and unsecured creditors; and thereby under-
mining a sophisticated bankruptcy-remote structure supporting over $277 million of mortgage-
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eral' trend toward allowing substantive consolidation to prevent harm caused 
by 'the widespread use of interrelated corporate structures.'''50 Tort theories 
also could be used to impose punitive damages. Moreover, the officers and 
directors of the companies involved in judgment proofing, as well as those 
companies themselves, might be subject to RICO, which not only would al-
low creditors of a judgment proofed company to recover treble damages and 
the costs of their lawsuits but also would impose criminal liability.51 Be-
cause RICO already has been applied in a wide range of commercial cases, 
creditors injured in a judgment proofing are likely to claim a RICO viola-
tion.52 And regardless of whether a RICO claim ultimately will be success-
ful, its stigma and the fact that it may be asserted against the individuals in-
volved as well as the companies is likely to have a significant deterrent ef-
fect.53 
ill. CONCLUSION 
In an arm's length context, the risks inherent in judgment proofing and 
F2's propensity to exaggerate those risks make it unlikely that F2 \vill assist 
in Fl's judgment proofing. Although non-arm's length judgment proofing is 
theoretically plausible, it has long been restricted by law. Professor LoPucki 
claims that computerization \vill facilitate non-arm's length judgment proof-
ing, but computerization cannot reduce the legal restrictions which provide 
the real deterrent. While LoPucki argues that one can conceive of judgment 
proofing transactions that might not be precisely restricted under existing 
law, I show that existing legal doctrines easily could be extended to cover 
those transactions. 
I agree, however, with Professor LoPucki's conclusion that no "struc-
tural impediment to judgment proofing exists in law."54 Indeed, I have ar-
gued not only that no such impediment is necessary but that such an impedi-
ment would be harmful because of its potential to "indiscriminately restrict 
the value creation ... that comes \vith business and financial innovation."55 
backed securities, arranged by the preeminent firm of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Cor-
poration). 
50. Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 37 (quoting In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 
820,828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). This type of an overall liberal trend is illustrated, for example, 
by Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, No. 97 CV. 2551, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1997) 
(holding a medallion owner liable for damages caused by a leased taxicab). 
51. See Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 43 & n.229. 
52. See id. at 43-44 & n.233. 
53. See id. at46-47. 
54. Irrefotable Logic, supra note 1, at 71. 
55. Inherent Irrationality, supra note 1, at 53. 

